

# **BRICS: Two Geopolitical Aspects**

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# Structure of the Presentation


- Two topics:
  - 1) The voting cohesion of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the UN General Assembly.
  - 2) Brazil's military weakness and the role of military power in the country's grand strategy.

# The BRICS at the UN

- Convergence: a measure of agreement between two countries. Whenever two countries cast the same vote (yes, no or abstain), there is convergence.
- The importance of measuring convergence:
  - Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe, Brazil's Sherpa to the 2009 and 2010 BRICS Summits: "The BRICS forum is not a normative forum, not a forum for negotiations, but *a forum for convergence*." (quoted in Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*, 2015, p. 89)
- Unity rate: a measure of cohesion within the BRICS group. Whenever all members cast the same vote (yes, abstain or no), there is unity.
- Defection: a measure of disagreement within the group. Whenever at least one country casts a different vote, there is a defection.
- Source: Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten, 2013, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379>.

# BRICS: Convergence with the US (1946-2012)

Convergence between each BRICS and the US at the UN General Assembly (1946-2012)




Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

Legend: Brazil (green triangle), China (purple cross), Russia (orange circle), South Africa (red square), India (blue asterisk)

# Convergence with Brazil


Convergence between each BRICS and Brazil at the UN General Assembly  
(1971–2012)



Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence with Russia


Convergence between the BRICS and Russia at the UN General Assembly (1971- 2012)



Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence with India


Convergence between each BRICS and India at the UN General Assembly (1971-2012)



Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence with China

Convergence between each BRICS and China at the UN General Assembly (1971– 2012)




Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)



# Convergence with South Africa

Convergence between each BRICS and South Africa at the UN General Assembly (1971-2012)



Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence Among the BRICS (1971-1989)

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Brazil	1				
Russia	0,66	1			
India	0,82	0,74	1		
China	0,81	0,75	0,85	1	
South Africa	0,34	0,22	0,24	0,15	1

Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence Among the BRICS (1990-2003)

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Brazil	1				
Russia	0,63	1			
India	0,79	0,60	1		
China	0,81	0,62	0,83	1	
South Africa	0,88	0,70	0,74	0,79	1

Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence Among the BRICS (2004 -2008)

	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>South Africa</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	<b>1</b>				
<b>Russia</b>	<b>0,70</b>	<b>1</b>			
<b>India</b>	<b>0,77</b>	<b>0,73</b>	<b>1</b>		
<b>China</b>	<b>0,84</b>	<b>0,79</b>	<b>0,82</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>0,89</b>	<b>0,77</b>	<b>0,79</b>	<b>0,88</b>	<b>1</b>


Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Convergence Among the BRICS from 2009 to 2012

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Brazil	1				
Russia	0,69	1			
India	0,82	0,68	1		
China	0,86	0,76	0,83	1	
South Africa	0,93	0,71	0,80	0,85	1

Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Yearly Unity Rates of the original BRICs at the UN General Assembly (1971–2012) (% of n = 3891)



Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

# Defection Rates within the BRICS according to Resolution topics (2009-2012)

UN Resolution Themes	Brazilian Defection		Russian Defection		Indian Defection		Chinese Defection		South African Defection	
	Agrees	Dissents	Agrees	Dissents	Agrees	Dissents	Agrees	Dissents	Agrees	Dissents
Political and Security	96	1	84	13	84	13	96	1	84	13
Economic Issues	20	0	17	3	20	0	20	0	17	3
Socio-technical-cultural	79	2	78	3	81	0	81	0	78	3
Decolonization-Tutelage	43	0	36	7	43	0	43	0	36	7
UN Management and Finances	4	0	4	0	4	0	4	0	4	0
Legal Issues	6	0	6	0	6	0	6	0	6	0
Palestine Issue	18	0	10	8	18	0	18	0	10	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>34</b>

Source: (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013)

## **Conclusion on the BRICS's cohesion rates at the UN**

- Growing unity within the BRICS group at UNGA.
- Russia is the main defector, particularly on political and security motions.
- Russia is the only member of the BRICS which is a declining power.



# **Doves vs. Hawks(?): The role of military power in Brazil's grand strategy**

- The dovish perspective.
- Brazil does not need and does not want military power to be invited to the best international tables, like Japan and Germany since 1945.
- Brazil does not need military power to defend itself from its weak neighbors.
- Brazil cannot afford to have real military power.
- Yes, Brazil is unlikely have a permanent seat on the UNSC, but it can get all the rest it wants without military power.
- Main doves: the Foreign Ministry.

# **Doves vs. Hawks(?): The role of military power in Brazil's grand strategy**


- The (sort of) hawkish perspective.
- Military power matters to Brazil, since the armed forces can help foreign policy in its effort to expand the country's bargaining capacity and autonomy.
- Due to its intrinsic importance, military power cannot, under any circumstances, be neglected as a useful tool to achieve the national interest.
- A weak military structure reduces the maneuvering room of the country's foreign policy.
- A weak military structure exposes the country to conditionalities set by foreign powers in the latter's disputes with Brazil.
- The lack of appropriate military capabilities also contributes to the reduction of Brazil's soft power.
- Brazil needs to develop military capabilities commensurate with its international status and ready to protect the country's growing interests in the international arena.
- Main authors: Joao Paulo Soares Alsina Jr., Domício Proença Jr., and Fabio Bertonha.

# BRICS: Military Capabilities

## **National Material Capabilities (CINC): the concept**


- The Composite Index of National Capabilitiy (CINC, Singer *et al*, 1972).
- Includes the production of iron and steel, urban population, total population, total military spending, total military personnel and total energy production of a country in relation to the total resources available in the international system.

# BRICS: National Material Capabilities (CINC) (1946-2007)




Source: Correlates of War, 2010.

# National Material Capabilities (CINC) of USA, France, United Kingdom, Japan and Germany (1946-2007)




Source: Correlates of War, 2010.


# Military expenditure of the BRICS, constant (2011) US\$ m., 1988-2014



# Military expenditure of the BRICS as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2014




# Military expenditure of the BRICS as percentage of Government spending (1988-2014)





# Military expenditure per capita of the BRICS (1988-2014) (Current US\$)



# Military Expenditures of the BRICS countries in 2014

<b>Country/Attribute</b>	<b>Military expenditure</b>	<b>Military Expenditure (%GDP)</b>	<b>Military Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure)</b>	<b>Military Expenditure (per capita)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	<b>37290</b>	<b>1,4%</b>	<b>3,4%</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>USSR/Russia</b>	<b>91694</b>	<b>4,5%</b>	<b>11,7%</b>	<b>593</b>
<b>India</b>	<b>49999</b>	<b>2,4%</b>	<b>9,1%</b>	<b>39,4</b>
<b>China</b>	<b>190974</b>	<b>2,06%</b>	<b>7,3%</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>4917</b>	<b>1,2%</b>	<b>3,5%</b>	<b>73,4</b>

# Military Assets: Comparison of BRICS with USA, France and UK

Attribute/Country	Brazil	China	India	Russia	South Africa	USA	France	UK
Nuclear warheads	0	~250	90-110	~8500	0	~7700	~300	225
ICBM (Launchers)	0	66	Tests	356	0	450	0	0
Bomber aircraft	?	120	?	141	0	154	0	0
Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines	0	4	Tests	11	0	14	4	4
Active personnel	318500	2333000	1325000	845000	62100	1492200	222200	169150
Armored infantry fighting vehicles	?	3621	1455	7660	534	4559	530	350
Main battle tanks	393	6840	2874	2750	34	2786	254	227
Artillery	1805	13216	9702	5837	1255	7429	375	660
Attack/Guided missile submarines	5	66	14	45	3	58	6	7
Aircraft carriers	1	1	1	1	0	10	1	
Cruisers, Destroyers & Frigates	14	69	24	32	4	103	23	19
Principal amphibious ships	1	3	1		0	30	4	7
Tactical aircraft	?	1817	826	1293	?	3293	311	223
Attack helicopters	9	108	20	392	5	907	40	66
Heavy/medium transport aircraft	20	65	33	184	7	721	37	32
Heavy/medium transport helicopters	54	307	105	616	39	2870	175	176
Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft	2	13	6	20		524	34	11
Airborne early-warning and control aircraft	5	18	3	23	?	101	7	6
Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles	0	Some	4	Some	0	469	4	10

# Brazilian Military Readiness in 2011: The Navy

<b>Equipment</b>	<b>Existing</b>	<b>Operational</b>	<b>Percentage Operational</b>
Ships	98	48	48,98
Aircraft	23	2	8,70
Helicopters	67	22	32,84
Tanks	74	33	44,59
Canons	30	15	50,00
Missile Launcher	26	12	46,15


# Brazilian Military Readiness in 2011: The Army

Equipment	Existing	Operational	Percentage Operational
Tanks	1953	1079	55,25
Helicopters	79	37	46,84
Wheeled Vehicles	6982	5318	76,17
Canons	722	571	79,09

# Brazilian Military Readiness in 2011: The Air Force


<b>Equipment</b>	<b>Existing</b>	<b>Operational</b>	<b>Percentage Operational</b>
Fighter	208	85	40,87
Patrol	298	100	33,56
Recon	14	8	57,14
Training	13	5	38,46
Inspection	114	74	64,91
Demonstration	9	3	33,33
Helicopters	73	27	36,99
Portable Missiles	48	48	100,00

# Percentage of Military Officers in the President's Cabinet (1946-2010)




Source: Planalto.gov

# Military Expenditure as % of Federal Expenditures (1945-2011)






# Military Personnel per one thousand inhabitants (1946-2008)




Source: Correlates of War; 2010 and IBGE via IPEADATA

# Average annual Brazilian contribution of personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations (1990 to 2014)



Source: UNITED NATIONS (2014)

# Number of Troops engaged in Law and Order Missions (GLO) (1988 to 2014)



# Concluding remarks on the role of military power in Brazil's grand strategy

- The doves have the upper hand and are very likely to remain so.
- Bismarck once said that Italy had a big appetite but poor teeth...
- Will Brazil follow on Italy's footsteps?